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Abstract 
Pre-employment screening of social media (SM) has become a common practice to assess 
prospective candidates’ fit to the job and gets increasingly automated with the application 
of people analytics. Besides some evidence that SM screening negatively affects 
applicants’ job pursuit intention in general, there is a lack of knowledge on the differential 
effects based on the type of the targeted SM network (private vs. professional) and the 
nature of the screening agent (human vs. self-learning algorithms). Drawing on 
signaling theory, we perform a vignette-based experimental study that aims at 
addressing this gap. The results indicate that only screening of private purpose SM 
profiles negatively affects job pursuit intention. Surprisingly, self-learning algorithms 
are perceived more negatively than humans. Our study contributes to IS literature by 
exploring the role of intelligent decision agents in the context of recruitment and the 
invasion of privacy in the digital world of work. 
Keywords:  algorithmic social media screening, people analytics, job pursuit intention,  
privacy invasion, vignette-based experiment 
Introduction  
Profiling prospective job applicants, i.e. the collection of online information via social media (SM), has 
become a common practice among human resources managers in order to assess the candidate’s fit to the 
job (McDonald et al. 2016). Thereby, the procedures applied in profiling are especially relevant for the 
hiring process since this pre-selection phase has significant potential to shape the individual job pursuit 
intention (Dineen et al. 2004). Individuals nowadays create profiles on SM to connect and communicate 
but also with the objective to present themselves to different audiences in personal and professional 
domains (Dery et al. 2014; Stoughton et al. 2015). Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, for example, are 
typically used by prospective applicants for personal purposes and others, such as LinkedIn or Experteer, 
are primarily used for professional networking and career development. 
Given the wide range of personal information available (e.g., gender, race, age, sexual orientation, religion, 
disability status) SM screening may be perceived as an invasion of privacy (Stoughton et al. 2015) and may 
trigger privacy concerns because applicants don’t have the control to present themselves as they want in 
that specific moment of screening and they might find it unfair to be potentially devaluated by an unknown 
person, especially if they are not aware of the exact time and content of the screening (Malhotra et al. 2004; 
Stoughton et al. 2015). Additionally, the screening of different types of SM profiles (professional or 
personal) might be perceived sensitive as regards privacy invasion since prospective applicants may feel 
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that job-irrelevant information is collected about them (Davison et al. 2012; Roth et al. 2016). Beyond, 
screening practices themselves are prone to a rapid change. The screening agent, the unknown entity 
conducting the screening and evaluating the applicantʼs fit to the job based on additional web-based 
information might not necessarily be the recruiter who also screens the application documents. This is 
mainly due to technological advancements and the use of more sophisticated computational methods in the 
selection process (Anderson 2003; Dickter et al. 2017). While screening the profiles of applicants manually 
has become a very common practice among recruiters, HR departments may increasingly apply analytics 
based on self-learning algorithms that automatically screen their applicantsʼ SM profiles (Dineen et al. 
2004).  
Against this backdrop, it is surprising that research on the applied procedures of SM screening has 
remained scarce so far. Drawing on signaling theory (Spence 1973) and extant research on the perception 
of algorithms, we perform a vignette-based experimental study that helps to clarify the role of two crucial 
aspects of SM screening procedures with regard to job pursuit intention, defined as the intent to apply to a 
position or continue in the application process (Highhouse et al. 2003; Madera 2012); 1) the nature of the 
targeted SM and 2) the role of the screening agent. By doing so, our study contributes to an emerging 
research stream that examines the effects of SM screening (Derous and Ryan 2018; Stoughton et al. 2015). 
Thereby, we address recent calls from the literature to determine whether the effects of screening practices 
on applicants’ reactions depend on the purpose (personal vs. professional) of the screened SM websites 
(Roth et al. 2016; Stoughton et al. 2015). Furthermore, we contribute to the IS literature by exploring the 
role of algorithmic decision agents in the workplace (Langer et al. 2016; Ötting and Maier 2018) and the 
invasion of privacy in the digital age (Bélanger and Crossler 2011; Smith 2004). 
Theory and Hypotheses  
Signaling theory (Spence 1973) assumes that there is an asymmetric distribution of information between 
two parties in the market. The theory has been widely applied in the management and recruitment literature 
(Connelly et al. 2011; Jones et al. 2014). In the early stages of a recruitment process, applicants have 
incomplete information about organizations, which makes it difficult to know what it might be like to work 
there. Due to this lack of information, they rely on signals which they receive from the organization in order 
to make inferences about organizational characteristics and organizational values (Jones et al. 2014). 
Within the application procedure organizations (the senders) send out various signals. Potential applicants 
in turn (the receivers) interpret these signals, in order to draw conclusions (Connelly et al. 2011). These 
conclusions then may affect the potential applicants’ decisions whether they will apply for a job and what 
they expect from the company if they accept one (Aiman-Smith et al. 2001; Jones et al. 2014). 
 
Drawing on signaling theory we argue that the announcement of SM screening will be interpreted by 
potential applicants as a signal of privacy invasion. Following this argumentation, we propose that 
announcing SM screening negatively affects applicants’ job pursuit intention. Indeed, there is some 
empirical evidence for this assumption. A study on students majoring in hospitality management indicates 
that job pursuit intentions of applicants were lower when SM screening was announced (Madera, 2012). 
There is also some evidence that applicants tend to perceive an organization which uses SM screening as a 
tool in the hiring process as less attractive than those organizations that do not because of a perceived 
invasion of privacy (Stoughton et al. 2015). Privacy concerns by internet users in general are linked to 
fairness perceptions and can stem from a lack of control, awareness and the type of collection (Malhotra et 
al. 2004). Although prospective applicants might have a professional SM profile, previous literature 
(Malhotra et al. 2004; Stoughton et al. 2015) suggests that if prospective applicants cannot participate in 
that selection processes and present themselves personally through interaction (Derous et al. 2004), when 
they don’t have information on the exact time of when data is collected about them (Malhotra et al. 2004) 
or when another person can de-evaluate them, they might perceive it as an invasion of privacy what can 
harm organizational attraction (Stoughton et al. 2015), which has been shown to be highly correlated to 
applicants’ job pursuit intentions (Aiman-Smith et al. 2001; Highhouse et al. 2003). Hence, we hypothesize: 
H1: The announcement of social media screening during the selection process negatively affects 
applicants’ job pursuit intention. 
Vice versa, prospective employees (now the senders) can signal their human capital to organizations (the 
receivers), usually by presenting their education and skills in application forms and credentials (Connelly 
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et al. 2011). With the upheaval of SM, prospective applicants find new platforms to exhibit their skills and 
benefits for prospective employers. In this context, professional purpose websites such as LinkedIn or 
Experteer are particularly used in order to present their curriculum vitae including former employers, 
professional, language and soft skills and at times references. However, applicants might have additional 
profiles on personal purpose SM like Facebook, and they usually do so for instance, in order to communicate 
with friends and acquaintances. On Facebook, prospective applicants usually neither share information 
with the aim of professional or career development nor do they expect that recruiters find that private-life 
and personal information useful when making pre-selection decisions (Curran et al. 2014).  
Following this, we argue that users tend to separate their professional and private life on different purpose 
SM profiles while recruiters do not make that distinction when gathering as much as possible information 
about prospective applicants by screening multiple SM profiles of one candidate (Davison et al. 2012). 
When recruiters cross these boundaries between their applicants private vs. professional profiles and the 
latter have limited control over this process (Kluemper and Rosen 2009) we assume that prospective 
applicants feel personal purpose SM screening as abusive behavior. As for personal SM profile screening, 
prospective applicants might disagree with screening and find it unfair since information which is not job-
related might be used as a selection criterion (Roth et al. 2016).  This may raise privacy concerns by the 
prospective applicant (Malhotra et al. 2004). Our arguments about the use of SM websites for different 
purposes thus lead to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Applicants whose personal social media profiles will be screened report lower levels of job pursuit 
intention than those whose professional social media profiles will be screened. 
With the advancement of analytics, automation has made inroads in the selection process and algorithms 
more and more take over the work of human recruiters, for instance in resume screening (Derous and Ryan 
2018). Recent IS research shows that automated agents are significantly differently perceived than humans 
(Hertz and Wiese 2018) which leads to the assumption that job applicants might react differently if an 
organization announces SM screening conducted by a human recruiter or by self-learning algorithms. 
Automated work, e.g. the work of algorithms, is more likely to be relied on when it comes to the need for 
analytical skills (Smith et al. 2016). 
The selection process of job applicants, in general, involves several criteria on how applicants want and 
expect to be treated (Derous et al. 2004). Derous et al. (2004) emphasized the importance of transparency, 
objectivity, job information, feedback and humane treatment. When feedback, humane treatment typically 
come into play in the later stages of the application process that entail face-to-face interactions and social 
tasks, analytical skills are needed in SM screening and objectivity seems specifically relevant.  
Classical resume screening by recruiters has been criticized due to its lack of fairness, rooting for instance 
in ethnic or friendship biases (Derous and Ryan 2018) and thus, a lack of objectivity. On the contrary, 
humans consider automated agents, such as algorithms, as being more objective and rational than humans 
(Dijkstra et al. 1998). In this context, human screening may be associated with rather superficial screening 
due to a lack of time and possibly less knowledge about where to look for the desired information. 
Algorithmic screening, in contrast, may be perceived as being more holistic and more thorough. In the case 
of SM screening, human resources managers are perceived as invaders of privacy when they screen job 
applicants’ SM profiles in search for more information about them (Stoughton et al. 2015). In addition, 
human SM screening has the potential to imply discrimination since questions regarding gender, race or 
sexual orientation are illegal to be asked in offline interviews but are openly accessible in SM (Kluemper 
and Rosen 2009). Thus understood, we argue that when SM screening carried out by humans is seen as an 
invasion of privacy, algorithms might be perceived as less intrusive as human recruiters due to greater 
ascribed objectivity. This leads us to the proposition that self-learning algorithms as screening agents might 
be more positively viewed in the selection process when a non-human agent is working anonymously and 
without human intervention through the SM profiles. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H3: Applicants whose social media profiles will be screened by a human agent report lower levels of job 
pursuit intention than those whose social media profiles will be screened by a self-learning algorithm. 
Method  
Participants 
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As the present study addresses potential applicants’ job pursuit intention, we asked 157 university business 
administration students to participate in the study. Students are appropriate subjects, as they are an 
important target group of time-consuming and costly recruiting efforts (Aiman-Smith et al. 2001; Sivertzen 
et al. 2013). In order to increase the practical relevance of our sample, we asked university students who 
were at an advanced stage in their study program to participate in the study, as they would soon be entering 
the labor market (e.g., Stockman et al. 2017). 
After manipulation checks (see below) our final sample consisted of 144 students of which 58% were female. 
Participants’ age varied between 19 and 31 years (M = 23.52 years, SD = 2.56). Participants were either at 
an advanced stage in their bachelor’s program (39.6%) or master’s program (60.4%). A vast majority 
indicated that they had prior experience with personal (99.3%) and professional (81.9%) SM websites. The 
participants predominantly specified that they were actual job-seekers or planning to be within a year 
(73.6%). In addition, a majority indicated that they had prior work experience (85.4%). In sum, we conclude 
that our sample is appropriate for an investigation of potential applicants’ job pursuit intention. 
Design and Procedure 
The estimation of models from cross-sectional correlational data lacks in terms of internal validity and do 
not permit causal claims. We seek to overcome these problems by conducting a randomized vignette-based 
experiment using a 2 x 2 pretest-posttest design. The vignette-based approach allows us to manipulate 
certain aspects of a written stimulus while controlling for confounding effects that would be not controllable 
in real-life settings (Evans et al. 2015). The pretest-posttest design allows us to capture the change in 
subjects’ job pursuit intention in isolation. This ensures that each participant serves as his or her own inner 
subject control, which increases the statistical tests’ power and precision (Morris 2008). We conducted a 
pilot study (N = 27) to check the clarity of the instructions and questionnaire items. The results revealed no 
need for modifications. The completion of the paper-and-pencil survey took about ten minutes. 
Similar to their own real-life situation, respondents were asked to imagine themselves as actual job-seekers 
before they were shown a part of a job advertisement from a fictitious company (e.g., Stockman et al. 2017). 
The participants were asked to read the information carefully. Then participants’ job pursuit intention was 
measured for the first time, thereby generating the pre-measurement (“baseline”). Subsequently, the 
participants received detailed information regarding the application procedure. The type of SM that will be 
screened [1 = private SM website (e.g. Facebook); 2 = professional SM website (e.g. LinkedIn)] and the 
screening agent [1= a self-learning algorithm; 2 = a human resource manager] were manipulated. A control 
group received information regarding the application procedure without any manipulation. The 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the five experimental conditions. After reading the 
information about the application procedure, participants were asked to indicate their job pursuit intention 
for the second time to generate the post-measurement. The difference between the pre- and post-
measurements yielded the isolated inner-subject change (Δ) in job pursuit intention. 
To enhance the external validity of our experiment, the job advertisement and the application procedure 
vignettes were created based on real information of established companies. In addition, we conducted a 
reality check by asking the participants to judge the reality of the application procedure. The ratings on a 
seven-point Likert scale, indicate a high level of experimental reality (M = 5.41, SD = 1.28). 
Measures 
Our principal construct, job pursuit intention, was measured using five-items developed by Highhouse et 
al. (2003) adding the two additional items used by Madera (2012) in a previous study on the current topic. 
The participants responded on a Likert scale with answers ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 
(“strongly agree”). An example item is “I would accept a job offer from this company”. The internal 
consistency of the overall scale was very good (pre-measurement: α = .91; post-measurement: α = .95).  
To assess the effectiveness of our manipulations we conducted several manipulation check items (e.g., “Will 
the company screen your SM profiles during the application procedure?”). We did so in order to verify 
whether participants had read the scenario carefully and were aware of our manipulations (Stockman et al. 
2017). Thereby we ensure that the manipulations elicited the desired effect (Evans et al. 2015). We removed 
all respondents who did not answer the questions correctly from the dataset, because it cannot be assumed 
that the manipulated factor triggered variation in the dependent variable. 
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Preliminary Results 
Results of an ANOVA suggest that the pre-measurement of applicants’ job pursuit intention was similar 
across all groups (p = .629; part. η² = .018). To compare the screening group with the control group, we 
performed a Welch’s t-test. We chose this test because it is robust to unequal sample sizes. The results 
provide support for hypothesis 1; t(107) = 7.32, p = .000. The mean scores for the no screening condition 
(M = .24, SD = .48) were significantly higher than those for the screening group (M = -.71, SD = 1.03).  
In order to test the other hypotheses, we conducted a two-way ANOVA on difference scores. In addition, we 
conducted an ANCOVA with the pre-measurement as the covariate and the post-measurement as the 
dependent variable and found comparable results. The manipulation overall has an impact on the 
participants’ job pursuit intention, as their perceptions differ significantly between the two measurements 
resulting in a significant inner-subject change (p < .000). Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations 
of the inner-subject change for each experimental condition. 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and difference scores across each condition 
Scenario 
Type of screening agent 
Type of SM profile 
11 
algorithm 
personal 
21 
human 
personal 
12 
algorithm 
professional 
22 
human 
professional 
00 
none 
none 
job pursuit intention Δ       -1.529 -.931 -.209 -.157 .244 
SD Δ 1.067 1.052 .670 .554 .481 
N (∑ 144) 30 28 25 30 31 
The ANOVA reveals a statistically significant main effect of the type of SM profile announced to be screened 
on applicants’ job pursuit intention, F(1, 109) = 41.669; p < .001; part. η² = .277, providing very strong 
support for hypothesis 2. It can be concluded that applicants whose personal social media profiles will be 
screened report significantly lower levels of job pursuit intention than those whose professional social 
media profiles will be screened. Hypothesis 3, which suggests that applicants whose social media profiles 
will be screened by a human agent report lower levels of job pursuit intention than those whose social media 
profiles will be screened by a self-learning algorithm, finds no support. Indeed, the type of screening agent 
has a main effect on applicants’ job pursuit intention, F(1, 109) = 4.006; p = .048; part. η² = .035. A post-
hoc test reveals that the effect ot the type of screening agent on job pursuit intention is significant in case 
of screening personal SM. However, the effect is inverse to the expectation. In conclusion, applicants whose 
personal SM profile will be screened by a self-learning algorithm report significantly lower levels of job 
pursuit intention than those whose personal SM profile will be screened by a human agent.  No significant 
interaction effect was found, F(1, 109) = 2.825; p = .096; part. η² = .025. The overall model explains 29.9% 
of the variance in applicants’ job pursuit intention (R2 = .318; corr. R2 = .299). Table 2 provides an overview 
of the ANOVA results.  
Table 2. Results of two-way ANOVA 
Source of Variation Type III SS df MS F Sig. part. η² 
Type of SM profile 30.787 1 30.787 41.669 .000 .277 
Type of screening agent 2.960 1 2.960 4.006 .048 .035 
Type of SM profile × Type 
of screening agent 
2.087 1 2.087 2.825 .096 .025 
Error 80.535 109 .739    
Total 174.286 113     
Corrected total 118.052 112     
 R-squared = .318 (adjusted R-squared = .299) 
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Discussion of Preliminary Results 
The most obvious finding to emerge from our experiment is that the announcement of screening applicants’ 
SM profiles negatively affects their job pursuit intention. This finding is consistent with Madera (2012). 
However, our results provide evidence that this effect is not limited to the hospitality industry. Our 
replication of Maderaʼs (2012) findings with a different subgroup reduces potential coverage error and 
indicates a high level of external validity. This is important as experimental studies have been often 
criticized for being low on external validity and a lack of it has been termed as a major concern within IS 
research (e.g, Lee and Baskerville 2003). Howewer, against the backdrop of signaling theory applied in our 
study, we find the result that SM screening is in general negatively perceived by prospective applicants very 
surprising. Especially the fact that screening professional SM profiles has a diminishing effect on 
prospective applicants to apply is counterintuitive because professional profiles are originally created by 
prospective applicants with the aim signal their qualifications for the job market. Obviously, companies that 
announce any form of SM screening, send “negative” signals to potential applicants. Like Derous et al. 
(2004) suggest, this may be due to the missing social process here, like the possibility of feedback, 
transparency, participation and humane treatment.   
Another very important finding is that the announcement of applicant screening on SM can have differential 
effects on applicants’ job pursuit intention, based on the nature of the targeted SM. In particular, the 
screening of personal SM profiles negatively affects applicants’ job pursuit intention. This result may have 
been anticipatable. However, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that provides empirical 
evidence for this proposition. In doing so, we address the lack of clear and consistent differentiation 
between personal and professional SM in the body of research that focuses on the effects of SM on applicant 
reactions (Roth et al. 2016; Stoughton et al. 2015). Future studies on the current topic are therefore 
recommended to distinguish between personal and professional SM profiles, because aggregating them into 
a single construct may mask their differential effects. Not to do so may yield in erroneous findings, resulting 
in wrong conclusions drawn for practice and research. 
Contrary to expectations, algorithmic SM screening results in lower job pursuit intention than screening by 
humans. There are several explanations for this result. First, it might be grounded in societal wariness 
regarding algorithms. Despite the growing utilization of self-learning algorithms, there is still much 
skepticism in society regarding their application. In the recent years, worries about the loss of control (e.g. 
humans lose control of powerful algorithmic systems), the negative impact on work (e.g. sophisticated 
algorithms displace human jobs) and ethical concerns (e.g. lack of ethical reasoning) have grown (Fast and 
Horvitz 2017). In this context, extant studies argue that algorithms are usually negatively perceived since 
humans tend to lack trust in them (Dijkstra et al. 1998). In addition, although prospective applicants share 
information publicly on SM, there are concerns about privacy invasion in relation when companies 
increasingly make use of these data (Mai 2016). This fear also has been stoked by headlines of the popular 
press, e.g. “Dear internet algorithms: Stop invading our privacy” (Jones 2018). Therefore, we assume that 
algorithmic screening triggers perceptions of privacy invasion, which reduce applicants’ pursuit intention.  
Drawing on theory from interpersonal relationships, many IS scholars have emphasized the importance of 
trust in the interaction between humans and automation (Hengstler et al. 2016; Smith et al. 2016). This 
applies in particular in case of radically new technologies where perceptions of risk must be overcome in 
order to underpin their acceptance (Hengstler et al. 2016; Malhotra et al. 2004). In the HRM literature it 
has been argued that trustworthiness is likely to affect applicant perceptions, attitudes and behavior during 
the selection process (Celani et al. 2008; Klotz et al. 2013). Lee (2018) found that hiring decisions made by 
algorithms are perceived as less trustworthy and evoked more negative emotions than human decisions. 
Similarly, as regards to social tasks trust in humans is usually higher than in automated systems (Smith 
2004; Smith et al. 2016). It might be possible that algorithmic decision-making in the early stages of the 
application procedure is perceived in a similar way. Another explanation for this finding may be a lack of 
general humanity within the application procedure. In the HRM literature interpersonal treatment has been 
found to be a crucial factor in recruitment and selection procedures (e.g. Derous et al. 2004). Derous and 
Witte (2001) stated that selection is not a one-way acquisition facilitated by the use of tools and emphasized 
the importance of interpersonal treatment. Already decades ago, Gilliland (1995) found that interpersonal 
treatment, the degree to which candidates are treated with warmth and respect, to be a crucial factor during 
selection. Thus, it may be possible that applicants perceive algorithmic screening agents as impersonal. 
Indeed, there are some indications that the use of algorithms in selection processes can be considered as 
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“dehumanizing” (Lee 2018). Furthermore, algorithmic screening may signal that the company wants to put 
less human effort into the recruitment process and may be less interested, so the typically requested 
humane treatment (respect, empathy) does not seem valuable for the company (Derous et al., 2004).  In 
addition, the reliance on algorithms in the recruitment process as a signal of automation may also signal 
less job security in the long run for the applicant (Cameron 2017). 
Limitations and Future Research  
Like most studies, ours has limitations. First, our study population is made up of students. Student samples 
have frequently been criticized, but they are a widespread study population for research on this topic 
(Madera 2012; Stockman et al. 2017) and reasonable in our study. Since we address potential applicantsʼ 
job pursuit intentions and studens are a major target group in recruiting efforts, it is important to gain 
knowledge on how their job pursuit intention is affected. Related to that sample, past work experience might 
be relevant. Our item regarding work experience was as follows: „Do you already have work experience 
(including internships and apprenticeships)?” This is in line with recent studies in the recruitment context 
(e.g., Stockman et al. 2017), but we find it useful that future studies include more sophisticated measures 
of prior work experience. A second limitation is linked to the manipulation of the screening agent in our 
vignettes. Specifically, we neither specified the underlying mechanism nor the concrete outcome of the work 
of the algorithm. Our rationale for treating the work of the screening algorithm as a blackbox, however, is 
in line with signaling theory as a theoretical background for our study. In this sense, the mere mentioning 
of the different screening agents is a signal for future applicants and affects their job pursuit intention. 
Third, as any experimental study, ours runs short in explaining how exactly SM screening, SM screening of 
personal websites as well as algorithmic screening in particular does affect prospective applicantsʼ job 
pursuit intentions. Future research could get more into these details through applying qualitative methods 
such as conducting interviews. Next, our pretest-posttest design may lead to demand effects. Future studies 
could replicate the findings using a posttest-only design. Finally, we suggest future research to delve deeper 
into other singnaling-based mechanisms such as perceived trust of the company. 
Conclusion  
The current study informs human resources and IS researchers on the role of algorithmic screening of 
professional and personal SM profiles for applicants’ job pursuit intention. Obviously, job pursuit 
intentions of individuals are lower when organizations announce that applicants’ SM profiles will be 
screened. However, there are differential effects, as the nature of the targeted SM plays an important role. 
Significant lower levels of job pursuit intention are only reported for screening personal SM profiles. 
Another interesting finding was that the experiment did not detect any evidence for the positive character 
of algorithmic agents. In the contrary, applicants reported significantly lower levels of job pursuit intention 
when a self-learning algorithm screens their personal SM profiles. Thus, the findings contribute in several 
ways to our understanding of how SM screening affects applicants’ job pursuit intention. 
Our study has implications on our knowledge about how SM screening and algorithms as screening agents 
have a potential to re-organize pre-selection practices and how signaling in the application process should 
be reconsidered. Signaling has been a major mechanism in the application and candidate selection process 
to balance information asymmetries and build trust in both directions – the potential employerʼs and the 
potential employeeʼs one. Professional SM profiles are a typical new medium for prospective applicants to 
signal their job fit. Surprisingly, however, prospective applicants perceive the announcement of SM 
screening negatively in general, i.e. regardless of whether the SM profile is for personal or professional 
purposes. This implies that the existence of SM profiles on the one hand might cause recruiters so perceive 
traditional signaling media, such as application documents, as insufficient or not suffiently trustworthy. On 
the other hand, the negative perception of SM screening by applicants shown in our study might imply that 
job applicants perceive too little trust by recruiters in their conventional application documents. Given that, 
we see application processes solely based on SM as an avenue for the future so that signaling structures of 
both parties involved again reach common ground. We believe that our theoretical isights and findings will 
encourage a more nuanced approach to screening practices in the age of SM and algorithms in HRM.     
So far, we have not tested the underlying signal-based mechanism by which causal influences are 
transmitted. As the project moves forward, we aim to open this black-box. In particular, we want to clarify 
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if invasion of privacy serves as a mediator of the observed relationships. In another follow up study it might 
be also fruitful to clarify if the different SM screening methods trigger different mediators. 
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